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TAMING THE OUTLAW SEA
Admiral James G. Stavridis, U.S. Navy, and
Lieutenant Commander Richard E. LeBron, U.S. Navy

T

he goods of the world move predominantly by sea. Across that broad global
commons, trade generally flows freely and well. Yet there are places today
1
where the term “outlaw sea” applies. Piracy, sadly, flourishes in several key
choke point regions of the world’s sea-lanes of communications. We must tame
this outlaw sea.
To many, the word “piracy” conjures images of seventeenth- and eighteenthcentury swashbuckling rebels brandishing cutlasses and flintlocks under the
ominous skull-and-crossbones flag, à la Walt Disney World’s “Pirates of the Caribbean” attraction. But to those who have been victims of their blades and bullets, the word invokes a darker “profession”—and one that continues today.
Pirates and corsairs of the “Golden Age of Piracy”—feared mariners with
names like Barbarossa, “Calico Jack” Rackham, “Black Bart” Roberts, and Anne
Bonny—have captured imaginations since early-eighteenth-century periodicals chronicled their crimes. But piracy is more than theft, rape, and murder on
the high seas. It is a systemic destabilizer of international norms of commerce,
economics, and trade. Piracy is also intertwined with conditions ashore. In particular, piracy in the waters off the Horn of Africa today results from deep social,
political, economic, and environmental problems in Somalia. It is the fruit of
anarchy, extreme poverty, and the severe failure of the rule of law. At the pragmatic level, however, piracy is an illicit entrepreneurial pursuit whose main objective is to maximize profit.
In other words, Somali pirates are armed opportunists who stem from a permissive and enabling environment formed by a weak state and who engage in a
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business enterprise subject to risk-and-reward calculations that can be influenced by the international community. The international community, including
various governmental and nongovernmental organizations, as well as private
enterprises, has an opportunity now to work together and exert the necessary influence both at sea and ashore to shift the calculus of piracy from profitable enterprise to futile folly.
The United Nations, the European Union (EU), the African Union, the Arab
League, and NATO are collaborating to influence the risk-and-reward analysis
of Somali pirates. A wide range of countries—including Australia, China, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Japan, Kenya, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Russia,
Singapore, Somalia, South Korea, and Ukraine—are cooperating to broadly address the issue as well.
Though piracy manifests itself most perceptibly at sea, it is a complex and
persistent land-based problem with political, social, and economic dimensions
requiring a long-term, comprehensive solution. To bring about a lasting cure to
the cancer of piracy, particularly off the Horn of Africa, two endeavors must be
undertaken in parallel. First, the risk of failure in hijacking a vessel at sea must be
increased to the point where piracy is no longer seen as an attractive and lucrative endeavor. In other words, pirates’ own calculations must yield deterrent
conclusions. Second, governance, stability, and security within Somalia must be
so improved that less risky yet reasonably profitable alternatives to piracy can be
fostered both at sea and ashore. The second task is a much more challenging
proposition than the first, given Somalia’s fragmented and unstable state.
CAPTURING THE LESSONS OF THE PAST
Lawlessness upon the sea is nothing new. Piracy is an ancient profession. Its history dates back to antiquity, preceding even the ancient Egyptians. Nautical bandits have plied the waves for nearly as long as people have used the seas for trade.
The Lukka raiders, for example, launched raids from the coast of Asia Minor as
early as the fourteenth century BC; Thucydides mentions pirates in his History of
the Peloponnesian War; and Herodotus writes of how pirates kidnapped the poet
2
Arion of Methymna in an attempt to steal his riches.
As is the case today in the Horn of Africa, piracy in the ancient Mediterranean
3
world flourished when there was an absence of central control. In periods when
the empire du jour—Egyptian, Greek, or Roman—was unable to maintain a
strong naval presence in the large inland sea, pirate communities spread along
its shores. Before the middle of the first century BC, piracy was a significant
4
problem in the Mediterranean. As Rome’s maritime trade of wheat and other
commodities flourished, piracy expanded. At their height pirates exerted dominion and control over the Mediterranean to an extent that left little room for
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5

free navigation or commerce. The economic impact was felt throughout the
Roman Republic as prices of goods—particularly of wheat, vital for feeding the
Roman people—grew out of control. Even young Julius Caesar was taken for
6
ransom by Cilician pirates, around 75 BC.
It was only when Rome’s power expanded to claim the whole of the Mediterranean basin—and the littorals whence pirates sailed—that piracy was eradi7
cated from the ancient world. Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus, known to history as
Pompey, was sent by the Roman people to wrest the seas from the pirates. In
combating piracy, Pompey focused on the act and its source, not exclusively on
the actor. Over a period of several months in 67 BC, with hundreds of ships and
120,000 soldiers, he swept the Mediterranean Sea and corralled the pirates in
their strongholds ashore.
8
Most surrendered. They did so because the risk of death or capture at sea in
future piratical attempts exceeded the potential rewards to be gained. But they
surrendered also because Pompey, understanding that piracy was bred in
rootlessness and social disorder, offered attractive alternatives ashore. He admitted some into the small towns of the Cilicians in Anatolia, and others he planted
in the city of the Solians, also in Anatolia; to the majority he granted land in the
9
ancient Greek province of Achaea to call their own and cultivate. With this land
he afforded the former pirates an opportunity to pursue an enterprise with more
acceptable risks and rewards and so helped turn the pirates into contributing
Roman subjects.
Pompey, then, wiped out Mediterranean piracy by countering pirates at sea
and by presenting former and would-be pirates with stakes in profitable and less
risky enterprises ashore. Though Somali pirates are unlikely to be presented
with land to call their own, Pompey’s actions provide a valuable demonstration
of the balanced application of hard and soft power both at sea and ashore, one
that is no less relevant and wise in combating piracy today than it was more than
two millenniums ago.
CONTROL OF THE SEA IS VITAL
Though Pompey’s strategic vision and his expedition against piracy were successful, not even the mighty Roman Empire ever extinguished piracy permanently. As civilizations and empires ebbed and flowed and control of what Alfred
Thayer Mahan later called a “wide common” was exerted and relinquished, so
10
too did the threat and impact of piracy fluctuate. In the early Middle Ages, the
Vikings raided and plundered their way across Europe, and later corsairs from
the North African “Barbary Coast” terrorized the Mediterranean Sea. Piracy also
waxed and waned in the Far East and in the Caribbean, as trade grew and the
tides of profit rose and fell. As merchants ventured to sea and maritime trade
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010
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expanded, pirates followed, ransacking vulnerable ships and cargo; they continue to do so to this day.
Today, however, pirates chase their prey not in galleys, sloops, or schooners
but in fast, open skiffs. They brandish not cutlasses and flintlocks but AK-47s
and rocket-propelled grenades and are aided by satellite phones, high-tech navigation gear, and competent and continually evolving networks ashore. The last
few years have witnessed a rising trend in piratical attacks around the world. In
2009, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reported 406 attacks, compared
to 293 in 2008, 263 in 2007, and 239 in 2006. In 2009, a total of 217 incidents carried out by suspected Somali pirates were reported to the IMB, making the area
off the Horn of Africa the number-one hot spot for piracy in the world.11 The attacks are becoming more violent, brazen, and sophisticated. The number of incidents where guns were used nearly doubled in 2009 from 2008 levels and has
12
tripled since 2005. Somali pirates have extended their reach, threatening not
only the Gulf of Aden and the east coast of Somalia but also the southern region
13
of the Red Sea, the strait of Bab el Mandeb, and the east coast of Oman.
The attacks listed in the IMB report were wide-ranging; they included eighty
attacks off the east and south coasts of Somalia, 116 in the Gulf of Aden, fifteen
in the southern Red Sea, four off Oman, and one each in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. In 2009, off the east coast of Africa alone, a total of 114 vessels were
fired upon, forty-seven vessels were hijacked, 867 crew members taken hostage,
14
four killed, and one missing. By comparison, throughout the rest of the world
six vessels were fired upon, two were hijacked, 185 crew members were taken
15
hostage, four were killed, and seven were missing. Since IMB figures are based
on self-reporting and many attacks may go unreported, the actual figures may
very well be much higher, particularly in areas where the level of international
focus on piracy is lower than it currently is off the Horn of Africa.
The year 2010 started with a bang for the twenty-four seamen of the chemical
tanker Premoni. The ship was attacked and hijacked, and its crew taken hostage
by Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden on 1 January. As of the second week of January a total of six vessels had been successfully attacked by pirates and bandits:
Premoni; a liquified propane gas tanker in Côte d’Ivoire’s Abidjan harbor; a vehicle carrier off the Horn of Africa; and a vehicle carrier, a chemical tanker, and a
bulk carrier in Southeast Asia. As of mid-April, a total of forty-eight vessels had
been attacked, or attacks had been attempted against them, off Africa’s eastern
shores. Globally, that number grows to a total of eighty-one vessels.
The annual cost of piracy is not accurately recorded, but it is not trivial, even
setting human costs aside. Piracy is estimated to cost anywhere between a billion
16
and sixteen billion dollars a year. Some countries are investing to thwart piracy
by increasing their military presences in high-risk areas. Some shipping
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss4/9
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companies are taking such measures as rerouting ships to bypass the Gulf of
Aden, hiring private security guards, and installing nonlethal deterrence equipment. Examples of the latter are the Long Range Acoustic Device, which was employed against pirates attempting to hijack the luxury cruise ship Seabourne
Spirit in late 2005, and Secure-Ship, an innovative electrified fence that surrounds the whole ship and uses a high-voltage pulse to deter boarding at17
tempts. But these actions all come at a price. For example, routing a tanker
from Saudi Arabia to the United States via the Cape of Good Hope adds approximately 2,700 miles to the voyage and approximately $3.5 million in annual fuel
18
costs. According to the U.S. Maritime Administration, the cost of avoiding risk
becomes more complex in the liner trades. If pirates were to become able to attack cruise liners successfully and regularly, the long bypass required to avoid
them would result in the need for additional vessels to maintain scheduled service and capacity commitments. For example, routing from Europe to the Far
East via the Cape of Good Hope rather than through the Suez Canal would incur
an estimated additional $89 million annually—$74.4 million in fuel and $14.6
million in charter expenses—without considering the added costs associated
19
with disruption of global supply chains. Also, insurance costs have soared over
the last few years. The cost of war-risk insurance premiums for vessels passing
through the Gulf of Aden, about five hundred dollars in 2007, was twenty thou20
sand dollars in 2008. A shipowner with a vessel worth $100 million can now reportedly expect to pay about $150,000 to cover its payload—a cost that is
21
ultimately passed on to the consumer.
Not all is bad news, however. The rate of successful hijackings in the vicinity
of the Horn of Africa dropped in the second half of 2009, to an average of one in
22
nine vessels targeted by pirates, compared to one in 6.4 in 2008. The decrease
can be attributed to expanded control of the sea around the Horn of Africa established through increased international cooperation and naval patrols; expanded coordination of naval patrols through the use of the Mercury secure,
Internet-based communication system; shared intelligence at the operational
level; and willingness of potential target ships to respond to military guidance,
comply with recommendations, and deploy effective protective measures. If
continued, these measures, particularly self-protection by potential targets, will
likely drive the rate of successful hijackings down further.
THE CHALLENGE ASHORE
In Somalia, where nearly ten million mostly nomadic pastoralist people live with
neither a permanent national government nor a formal economy and where
pervasive and violent crime is an extension of the general state of insecurity, piracy is perceived pragmatically, as an opportunity for profit.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010
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In a recent National Public Radio report, for example, a Somali pirate nicknamed “Boya” declared, “I’ll be a pirate until I die. . . . We understand what we’re
doing is wrong. But hunger is more important than any other thing.” Another
pirate acknowledged that “sometimes doing a bad thing is the only way to improve the situation for yourself and the people you love.” That same pirate also
described how he had “worked his way up” from indigent lobster fisherman to
pirate and then, having made enough money to get his siblings out of southern
Somalia and into neighboring Kenya, had quit. He would, he asserted, never go
23
back to being a pirate.
Though just two examples, the above vignettes offer a glimpse of the factors
influencing individuals to shoulder Kalashnikovs, board open skiffs, and head to
sea in search of easy prey. It also brings into focus a fundamental fact of piracy:
that at its core, piracy is a land-based challenge.
Even so, piracy is most often looked at as a waterborne problem. In fact, article
101 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) defines piracy as, in part, “any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private
ship or a private aircraft, and directed (i) on the high seas, against another ship or
aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; against (ii) a
24
ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any state.”
This definition, though adequate for the framing of law-enforcement and
antipiracy activities on the high seas, does not account for the dual challenge that
characterizes piracy. UNCLOS article 101 is focused on the symptom, the crime at
sea, and not the cause, the deplorable conditions ashore. To address the challenge
of Somali piracy, the UN Security Council has approved resolutions 1816, 1838,
1846, and 1851—all containing authority to use “all necessary means” to counter
piracy. Broadly speaking these resolutions encourage states to develop a cooperative framework to oppose piracy in the region and grant specific authority to “cooperating states” to enter Somalia’s territorial sea to repress piracy in a manner
consistent with international law. Resolution 1851 authorizes “cooperating states”
to go farther and engage in antipiracy action on Somali soil—a complex endeavor
even under the best of circumstances and one that ought to focus on building the
capacity of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government to fulfill its responsibility
25
to the Somali people and root out piracy and armed robbery at sea. That said,
none of those resolutions authorize any state to address the deplorable conditions
ashore that are arguably why individuals find piracy potentially attractive. Perhaps
it is time for the international community to focus on the root causes.
Piracy off the Horn of Africa has its sources in economic deprivation and political instability. It is a multifaceted problem that calls for a comprehensive
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solution involving actions and activities ashore as much as focused naval power
at sea. In the words of Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, “There is no purely
military solution to it, and as long as you’ve got this incredible number of poor
people and the risks are relatively small, there’s really no way to control it unless
26
you get something on land that begins to change the equation for these kids.” If
the international community believes piracy off the Horn of Africa is a serious
matter that must be resolved, it must seriously consider broad solutions that go
beyond the obvious and expedient application of naval power at sea. In countering piracy, as in most security efforts, the solution will be found in a balanced
and comprehensive approach. If piracy in those strategic waterways is ever to be
eradicated, it will take the coming together of governments, nongovernmental
organizations, international organizations, and the private sector in the partnerships necessary to deliver security, stability, sustained economic development,
and prosperity in Somalia. Hard military and law-enforcement activities are
necessary but not enough. Pompey understood the need for this balance in the
Mediterranean more than two thousand years ago; it is a fact that must not be
overlooked in the Horn of Africa today.
AN OPPORTUNITY FOR COOPERATION
Recognizing that no one nation has all the resources required to guarantee safety
and security throughout the maritime domain, the international community
must commit enough maritime assets—platforms, capabilities, and ideas—to
make acts of piracy both risky and difficult to conceal, thereby treating the symptom of piracy at sea. International operations such as NATO’s Operation OCEAN
SHIELD, the EU’s Operation ATALANTA, and Combined Task Force 151—all supporting international efforts to combat piracy off the Horn of Africa—are excellent examples of such a collaborative effort among international partners.
Certainly more ships would be helpful and welcomed, but even more valuable
would be increased inputs from overhead satellites and greater deployment of
maritime patrol aircraft and long-range surveillance assets.
There are many ways to collaborate and cooperate in conducting maritime
security operations. There are expansive capabilities outside the military. For instance, Stephen M. Carmel, senior vice president of maritime services at Maersk
Line, Limited, recently wrote about employing commercial shipping in preserv27
ing maritime security. Carmel describes how Maersk Line—the world’s largest
container shipping company, with over a thousand ships of various types—can
offer what he called “overwhelming, persistent global presence” and a “good
vantage point from which to see what is going on in the global commons.”
Commercial shipping vessels—the very targets of pirates—can be found
throughout the area of interest. Maersk has operations in nearly three hundred
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010
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ports around the world and makes thirty-three thousand port calls a year—one
28
every fifteen minutes, every day of the year. No single navy can make such a
claim, and no single nation can see what Maersk’s ships see every day—and
that’s just one company. The implications of these statistics are enormous. If
each one of the thousands of commercial vessels at sea were to contribute to a
partnership for maritime surveillance and reporting, domain awareness would
29
potentially improve by orders of magnitude, as would the ships’ own security.
Each potential partner can bring something that can elevate the comparative
advantage at sea of antipiracy forces. The UN, the EU, and NATO must seek, create, and leverage opportunities for maritime collaboration. But the maritime
piece is just part of the puzzle. Maritime surveillance capabilities and capacity
for maritime law enforcement and military engagement at sea must be integrated with the efforts of nonmilitary government agencies, nongovernmental
organizations, and public and private ventures ashore. Ultimately, piracy must
be resolved on land, by enabling Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government to
deliver security and create jobs and thereby reduce the risk of engaging in legitimate enterprises ashore.
Of course, and as we have noted, this is much easier said than done. In Somalia the internal challenges are daunting. Somalia’s internationally recognized
Transitional Federal Government has been unable to establish itself as the legitimate regime, and most of the country is outside its control.30 Somalia’s weak
government serves as a catalyst for piracy and exacerbates the challenges of
countering pirates at sea.
The lack of capacity and domestic legislation in Somalia and an absence of
clarity as to how to dispose of pirates after they are captured have hindered international action against the pirates off the coast of Somalia and in some cases led
31
to pirates’ being released without facing justice.
To counter piracy at sea effectively, there must be a viable and legitimate
central authority ashore capable of enforcing the rule of law. As the commander of U.S. naval forces in Europe and Africa and of NATO’s Allied Joint
Task Force Command in Naples, Admiral Mark P. Fitzgerald, recently commented, “Somali-based piracy . . . will not go away until a government in Moga32
dishu is stable enough to confront the problem within its borders.” The
nations of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Maldives, Madagascar, Seychelles, Yemen, Tanzania, Kenya, and Somalia have all pledged their support to seizing, investigating, and prosecuting pirates off Somalia’s coast, but the solution to piracy in
the Horn of Africa ultimately lies within Somalia itself.33 It is of little help in
long-term piracy eradication if naval forces must operate in a catch-and-release
mode because it is difficult or impossible to prosecute pirates.
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STRONGER TOGETHER
In this interconnected world, international security and prosperity depend
heavily upon the sea. Skillful cooperation and collaboration at sea and ashore
are vital components to ensuring the free and lawful use of the world’s waterways. Piracy in the Horn of Africa presents the international community with a
complex and multidimensional challenge but also with a golden opportunity to
come together and work collaboratively to solve it.
Beyond naval assets, the international community has an opportunity to take
a comprehensive approach to countering piracy, one that focuses on a broad
range of issues including deterring and disrupting piratical activity at sea; capturing pirates and bringing them to justice; developing regional and international agreements to prosecute suspected pirates effectively and humanely and
legally punish them when found guilty; enabling Somalia’s Transitional Federal
Government to extend and enforce the rule of law; and encouraging the economic development of Somalia over the long term. Countering piracy off the
Horn of Africa is an effort that must reflect international will, must focus on
building the capacity of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government and the
governments of neighboring countries, and be coordinated centrally and skillfully (by an internationally sanctioned body) so as to achieve a holistic effect.
The European Union, given its recent successes with Operation ATALANTA and
its growing commitment to combating piracy off the Horn of Africa, seems a
logical international body to lead this effort.
Broadly speaking, the international community must undertake projects to
build the capacity of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government to extend the
reach of the rule of law. Additionally, investment in developing the capacities of
the other countries in the region to detain, prosecute, and punish pirates is key.
NATO in particular can play a role in this regard in developing partner
capacity to combat piracy, and it is expected to do so within the framework of
the Contact Group on Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia, in a low-cost and
noncontentious way. Simultaneously, international humanitarian work ashore
must be encouraged and protected—an increasingly complex endeavor. The
combination of conflict, drought, floods, and disease that has ravaged the
country for decades has created a humanitarian catastrophe for some 3.64 million Somalis—more than half the population—who are in need of livelihood
or humanitarian support. This environment of extreme penury and human
displacement, where one in five children under five years old is acutely malnourished, adds to internal instability and serves as a catalyst for illicit activities, such as piracy, that in turn can further destabilize the region. The creation
of alternative livelihoods through public/private partnering ashore, as well as
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afloat, is vital. From the enablement of subsistence farming through irrigation
to the development of environmentally sustainable coastal fish farms, to environmental remediation to support both agriculture and aquaculture, to the
generation of microloans to facilitate the creation of small business—the
range of possibilities is enormous and limited only by the imagination and will
of the international community.
Beyond the low-water mark, control of the sea and maintenance of maritime
domain awareness are essential to the eradication of piracy and armed robbery
at sea. Programs now ongoing and initiatives currently being staffed within
NATO’s Allied Command Operations are squarely aimed at exploiting potential
synergies in parallel with, and in support of, the EU and coalition maritime
forces, as well as several national initiatives. Efforts include the close cooperation and exchange of information related to antipiracy efforts between various
players within NATO and between NATO, the EU, the UN, the African Union,
and the Arab League. Continued cooperation is paramount and must be expanded. We must achieve fusion in existing command-and-control structures,
to include the use of space-based surveillance assets, NATO AWACS (airborne
surveillance and control) aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles. Other ideas include the “tagging” of vessels identified as legitimate commercial and private
craft, employment of convoys and escorts, a tactical shift to blockading pirates’
points of embarkation, and, in cooperation with commercial entities, the use of
more effective nonlethal, nonmilitary piracy countermeasures aboard merchant
and passenger vessels. All of these options would serve, in combination, as complementary efforts to make acts of piracy more risky and therefore less likely to
succeed.
Understanding that piracy is neither an at-sea problem alone nor a challenge
with a single and isolated solution will go a long way toward taming the “outlaw
sea.” In addressing the root cause of piracy, the European Union, empowered by
international consent and in partnership with the broader international community, must wisely consider, as the Greek historian Plutarch suggests, that
“man by nature is not a wild or unsocial creature, but is transformed by the unnatural vice; whereas he may be softened by new customs and a change of place
and life.” Upon that consideration it should do as Pompey did and give pirates a
taste of an “honest life by dwelling in towns and tilling the ground” or by casting
34
their nets and harvesting the fruits of the sea. The solutions to piracy will not
likely be delivered by warships at sea alone; rather, they will emerge from a careful balance of security and development both afloat and ashore.
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